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B
anking is now, and has always been, a risky business.” This succinct and cau-
tionary  statement  was  the  first  sentence  of  the  executive  summary  of
Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present, and Future, a book
written in 1986 on the eve of a troubled time in banking but still relevant in
today’s more stable banking environment. The book’s five authors were commis-
sioned by the American Bankers Association “to undertake a comprehensive
study of the issues surrounding the safety and soundness of the banking indus-
try and the efficacy of its regulatory system.” The five academic consultants
divided the task of writing the report among themselves, reviewed each other’s
work, and came to a consensus on policy options and recommendations. These
recommendations have in many ways served as a blueprint for the changes in
banking’s regulatory framework that have occurred in the twenty years since the
book’s publication.
At  the  August  2006  conference  celebrating  the  twentieth  anniversary  of
Perspectives  on  Safe  and  Sound  Banking, the five authors gathered once
more to reflect on the state of the banking industry. In their comments on the fol-
lowing pages, they assess how legislative and regulatory changes during the past
two decades have reshaped the banking landscape, and they weigh in on what
tasks remain to ensure that the banking system, and the larger financial system
with which it has become so intertwined, remains healthy.  
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I
reread our book, Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present, and
Future, with some concern that I might be dismayed and disappointed at what we
wrote. After all, we should have learned more in the past twenty years, knowledge
that would allow us to avoid some mistakes and misunderstandings. Or, since the
world we analyzed has changed during this time, some of our conclusions and pre-
scriptions might be dated or even irrelevant. Since I had not looked at the book for
twenty years, I read it almost as if it were written by other authors. Much to my relief
and delight, with a few exceptions that I note later, I found the book to be quite good
and still largely relevant. We introduced the discussions with a substantial amount of
financial history and the findings of empirical studies and based most of our policy
conclusions on this record. Indeed, we wrote our recommendations after essentially
completing the book, so they were based on our narrative rather than the narrative
having been structured to support predetermined conclusions.
Since 1986 the United States has seen some important changes. These include
a complete unraveling of the savings and loan industry, the failures of commercial
banks in the late 1980s, and the Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Act of
1989, enacted in reaction to the failures. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) was the most important regulatory change because
it established a system of structured early intervention and resolution. In 1994 the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act finally brought nation-
wide branch banking to the United States. The 1999 Financial Services Modernization
Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) essentially repealed the sections of the Banking Act of 1933
(the Glass-Steagall Act) that separated commercial and investment banking and estab-
lished financial holding companies that could include banks, insurance companies or
agencies, and securities firms as subsidiaries. In addition to the legislative changes, the
Internet and electronic banking have changed and continue to change substantially
the way banking and other financial services are delivered to consumers. 
Looking Back Twenty Years: 
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These remarks were presented as part of a roundtable discussion at the conference “Safe
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causes, including debunking the role of bank runs and emphasizing fraud as an impor-
tant contributor. Fraud and malfeasance still is important, and, from recent experience,
it appears that the banking authorities are still not dealing with it effectively. We sug-
gested that failures could be dealt with more efficiently with trusteeships, wherein
expected losses would be deducted from the balances of uninsured deposits and other
debt (“haircuts”), rather than with FDIC-funded purchase and assumptions (P&As).
This proposal was adopted in the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 in the
form of bridge banks. Furthermore, FDICIA now provides for the resolution of insol-
vent banks in the least costly manner, which largely obviates P&As. We also recom-
mended that an institution be closed before the market value of its net worth declined
below 1 or 2 percent. This recommendation was adopted, albeit for book-value net worth,
by FDICIA. As noted later, I now wish we had suggested a higher level, at least 3 per-
cent, since book or even market values of net worth tend to be overstated when a bank
is experiencing severe financial distress.
The role and reformation of deposit insurance were and still are linked to concerns
about bank failures. The experience of savings and loan failures in the early 1980s
caused many observers to question the desirability of deposit insurance since it allowed
insolvent savings and loans to continue operations and even expand. We rejected,
correctly I believe, some alternatives that were proposed (such as privately provided
deposit insurance). We called for risk-adjusted premiums based on off- as well as on-
balance-sheet items. Capital requirements now include off-balance-sheet obligations.
The Basel I capital requirements, adopted in 1988, are based on risk-adjusted assets,
which are a form of risk-based deposit insurance. A small degree of risk-adjusted
deposit insurance was adopted (as mandated by FDICIA), and the FDIC has recently
proposed a system of risk-based deposit insurance premiums. I regret now that we
urged the adoption of these premiums. It is very difficult for well-meaning and pro-
fessionally capable banking regulators to determine the magnitudes and application
of such premiums since (as Basel I and the struggles over Basel II have shown) it is very
difficult for them to establish metrics that meaningfully measure risk. Furthermore,
as experience also shows, it is even more difficult to keep political considerations
from distorting the risk-assessment system. 
Following the publication of Safe and Sound Banking, George Kaufman and I
worked on a paper that changed my opinion about how the deposit insurance fund
could best be protected.
1 In that paper (prepared for an American Enterprise
Institute conference), we developed structured early intervention and resolution (SEIR)
for regulating bank capital that largely obviated the need for deposit insurance and,
hence, the need for risk-based deposit insurance premiums. 
SEIR delineates levels of the ratio of capital to assets (including off-balance-sheet
items) that specify when the banking authorities may and when they must intervene
in a bank’s operations. When the bank’s capital/assets ratio is over 10 percent, we sug-
gested that there should be minimum regulation and supervision. The banks would
be subject only to general reporting and examination requirements. When the ratio
declines to 6 percent, regulatory supervision and monitoring would be more inten-
sive. The authorities would have discretion to reduce or suspend dividend payments
and payments to the bank’s holding company and other affiliates. The bank would
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have to prepare and implement a business plan to raise its capital/assets ratio to at
least 10 percent. Should the ratio decline further but still be above 3 percent, the
authorities would no longer have discretion, thus obviating moral hazard wherein
political pressure or their own desire to put off difficult decisions results in forbearance.
The authorities would have to require that the bank suspend dividend payments and
interest on and redemption of subordinated debt and fund flows to its parent or affil-
iates. When the ratio declines below 3 percent, resolution of the bank would be manda-
tory. We expected that resolution would happen rarely since bank owners would have
strong incentives to protect their remaining capital by taking actions to recapitalize, sell,
merge, or liquidate the bank before the authorities had to take it over. The exception,
we expected, would be situations in which the numbers constructing the capital/assets
ratio were fraudulent. Hence, we recommended examinations, statistical analyses, and
attestations by independent public accountants to uncover such situations before a bank
became insolvent.
We also recommended that capital be measured in terms of market values and
that subordinated debentures be counted fully as regulatory capital, as did Safe and
Sound Banking. Both in our paper and in the book, we pointed out that numbers
that do not reflect current economic values provide wrong signals to both regulators
and bankers. We urged that subordinated debentures be included fully in capital
largely because this inclusion would eliminate the principal cost of the higher capital
by allowing banks to hold capital where its cost (interest) is deductible from taxable
income. We also pointed out, though (as did the book), that banks’ difficulties in
replacing maturing subordinated debentures and interest on those obligations would
provide the authorities with useful signals on the banks’ risk as well as a form of risk-
adjusted deposit insurance premiums.
Our basic SEIR proposal was included in FDICIA, albeit at lower capital ratio levels
than we suggested. Unfortunately, both capital based on market values and the subor-
dinated debt proposal have not yet been adopted. Indeed, the authorities have not even
taken advantage of the market values that banks now report to shareholders. The
Financial Accounting Standard Board’s Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
(SFAS) 107 requires banks to report in footnotes the fair values of financial instruments.
SFAS 115 requires banks to report the increases and decreases in the market values of
securities held for sale in comprehensive income and the fair values of securities held to
maturity reported in a footnote. Regulatory capital could easily be based on these mar-
ket value numbers rather than on book values, if the authorities so chose. 
Several chapters of Safe and Sound Banking were devoted to the organization of
banking supervision and regulation. We examined the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-
resort function and documented that the Fed had loaned funds to banks experiencing
financial distress at subsidized rates, a practice we criticized. We recommended that
such lending would best be made by the deposit insurance agency because its incen-
tive to protect the deposit insurance fund would lead it to make optimal decisions. A
second-best procedure was for the Fed to lend only on sound collateral at market rates.
This recommendation, but not our first choice, was adopted in FDICIA.
We reviewed the evidence on risks, conflicts of interest, and concentration of
power and their relation to bank holding companies and their nonbank affiliates. This
review led us to conclude that the deposit-insured banking organization should be
restricted to activities whose risks can be assessed and easily monitored. Because the
evidence indicated that holding company affiliates tend to be operated as a group, we
recommended imposing risk regulation and risk-based insurance premiums on the
consolidated entity. 
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subordinated debt, I now would limit supervision and regulation to depositories and be
concerned with other affiliates only to the extent of fund transfers from the depositories
to other companies owned by controlling shareholders. I would have the Bank Holding
Company Act repealed. Supervision and regulation would restrict the depositories’
activities only if these were so undiversified and risky that a negative outcome might
exhaust the depositories’ economic capital
before the authorities could intervene to
have the capital restored or the depository
taken over.
The numbers banks report as their
capital must be trustworthy. We examined
evidence on the efficacy of bank examina-
tions for assessing the risks and legality of
banks’ activities, verifying the numbers reported, and giving banks incentives to report
their financial data honestly and accurately. As noted earlier, we emphasized the impor-
tance of fraud as a cause of bank failures and reviewed evidence that pointed to the
banking agencies’ weaknesses in discovering and reducing frauds. Unfortunately, many
of these criticisms still appear to apply since fraud is still an important cause of failures.
Finally, we considered several proposals for reorganizing the structure of banking
supervision and deposit insurance. We discussed such issues as the cost of regulation,
including the imposition of fees by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency but
not by the other supervisory agencies, and incomplete cooperation among the
banking agencies that allowed insolvent institutions to avoid being closed expeditiously.
We also pointed out that deposit insurance premiums were charged against all deposits
even though only deposits of $100,000 or less were insured and that all deposits of
very large banks were de facto insured since they were considered to be “too large to
fail.” We then reviewed various proposals, particularly the task force chaired by (then)
Vice President George Bush. The task force recommended giving the Federal Reserve
authority to regulate and examine all nonproblem state-chartered banks and “inter-
national class” bank holding companies, creating a new agency that would regulate
and supervise national banks and their holding companies, and limiting the FDIC to
dealing with problem and insolvent banks. The FDIC countered that it should exam-
ine all federally insured banks, thrifts, and their affiliates. 
We rejected combining the federal agencies into a single supervisory and regula-
tory agency or making the Federal Reserve or FDIC the chief regulator. Rather, we rec-
ommended  that  the  Federal  Reserve’s  examination  and  supervision  operations  be
transferred to a new agency; the Fed would no longer supervise banks and bank hold-
ing companies. The new agency and the other federal banking agencies would be given
that portion of the deposit insurance funds that were contributed by the banks and
thrifts each supervised, and the agencies would be authorized to deal with and close
problem banks. Banks could shift to another agency, with its permission. Thus, the
supervisory agencies would have both the incentives and the ability to structure regu-
lations that would both attract members and protect its deposit insurance fund.
Unfortunately (but, given the strong incentives of bureaucracies to protect their turfs,
not surprisingly), this proposal has not yet been taken seriously. I still hope, though,
that it will be adopted in my lifetime since I hope to live for a long time and continue
my association with those great colleagues who, together, researched, argued about,
and wrote Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present, and Future.
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A
fter hearing both the papers prepared for this conference and the discussions
that followed the presentations, I want to reflect briefly on several different
issues discussed in Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking. I plan to first focus
on the issues that were probably, in hindsight, overemphasized, those that were per-
haps underemphasized, and those that were not fully appreciated but subsequently
turned out to be important. Finally, I want to raise issues that should be on any agenda
for the future. 
Issues Overemphasized in the Study
Risk-based deposit insurance. A key issue in the finance literature and in the study
was the desirability of gearing deposit insurance to risk and using options pricing the-
ory to price that risk appropriately. While risk-based premiums were adopted in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), implementation
has proved to be problematic. Premiums are arguably too low and are collected only
from more risky institutions. Beyond this, however, are two issues that limit risk-based
pricing as a useful means to control risk taking. The first is the realization that appro-
priate pricing depends upon not only the ability to measure risk but also to close an
institution promptly when it becomes insolvent. Second, effective risk monitoring and
control involves a trade-off between the costs of monitoring a bank’s risk exposure
continually against both the expected costs of that monitoring and expected losses
should an institution become insolvent between examinations or inspections. 
Revisions to regulatory agency structure and lender of last resort. The
report recommended several changes in bank regulatory agency structure, including
creating a competing deposit insurance option to be administered by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, parceling out lender-of-last-resort administration to the
insurance agencies using funds drawn from the Federal Reserve, and taking the
Federal Reserve out of the prudential supervision area. It probably is not practical to
Hindsight and Foresight about 
Safe and Sound Banking
ROBERT A. EISENBEIS
At the time of the conference, the author was executive vice president and director of
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Future,” held August 17–18, 2006, and cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Banks of San
Francisco and Atlanta and the founding editors of the Journal of Financial Services Research.
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depository institution insurance funds, and only the central bank can provide credible
lenders-of-last-resort funds. However, two issues are important. First was the sug-
gestion that the insurance funds should have a primary role in banking supervision
because they have the strongest incentives to monitor bank risk exposures. In the
United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is in the first loss
position should a failure occur. It also, under FDICIA, is acting as the agent for other
banks that stand to lose should FDIC funds be exhausted. Second, this view on super-
vision stands in stark contrast to how deposit insurance and supervisory responsibil-
ities are apportioned in the European Union, where generally deposit insurers are not
involved in supervision. 
Issues Underemphasized in the Study
Prompt corrective action. While the study did argue that institutions should be
closed via a prompt corrective action (PCA) scheme before net worth fell to zero, the
importance of PCA combined with structured early intervention and resolution
(SEIR)—a concept that evolved later—as perhaps the best way to protect taxpayer
interests was not fully realized. These concepts and their link to banking soundness
have proved important not only in the United States, where they have been codified
under FDICIA, but also as a framework for dealing with supervision and prudential
soundness issues in a cross-border banking world. 
Accounting issues. The report argued for market-value accounting, which,
when combined with PCA and SEIR, is necessary to protect the taxpayer from the
costs of regulatory forbearance. The importance of market-value accounting, or at
least the need to calculate the market value of banks’ equity, has yet to gain much
traction in regulatory circles. Much attention has been given to the problem of imple-
menting market-value accounting. But more focus has been directed to capital ade-
quacy, which turns out to be diverting the attention of regulatory agencies from the
fundamental problems of measuring net worth. Putting the valuation issue front and
center, especially in a global environment with more and more derivatives and other
exotic financial assets coming together, looms as the critically important—but as yet
unrecognized—problem for banking supervisors.
Controlling regulatory incentives. One of the key problems in the past has
been the tendency of regulatory and supervisory agencies to engage in forbearance
toward troubled institutions. FDICIA requires the FDIC to minimize failure costs to
taxpayers and requires disclosure and explanations when losses do occur. However,
banking regulators—with differing mixes of goals and responsibilities—can still be
faced with conflicts of interest and agency problems, which can sometime lead to
less-than-optimal decisions in dealing with troubled institutions. Indeed, Eisenbeis
and Wall (2002) have shown that many institutions are still closed with losses to the
insurance fund, suggesting that PCA is not always having its desired outcome. Kane,
for example, has devoted considerable attention to controlling regulatory incentives,
which remains a problem both in the United States and abroad (see Hovakimian, Kane,
and Laeven 2003; Kane 1988, 1989, 1991, 2000, 2003, 2006).
Consolidated risk management. The report argued that regulatory approaches
that attempted to separate risk taking within a bank holding company structure—
either to protect bank subsidiaries from risk taking in sister banks or from risks in
nonbanking subsidiaries—were fruitless. Subsequent developments show that
increasingly banking organizations are consolidating risk management and operations
functions so that subsidiaries and affiliates are not operationally independent of each
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other. This trend suggests that the report’s conclusion about how conceptually to
approach the supervision of complex institutions rings truer today than ever and
should be an important focus of banking supervision and risk control going forward. 
Underappreciated Issues
Over the past twenty years the financial system has evolved in ways that have
changed its structure and risk profiles, significantly changing the way that institu-
tions take on risk and control their risk exposures. Three such developments were
underappreciated by authors at the time in terms of either the speed or significance
with which they might affect bank safety and soundness. The first was the removal
of McFadden Act restrictions on interstate banking and the speed and manner in
which the banking system structure changed. Within a few short years, bank mergers
significantly reduced the number of banking organizations, increased the size of the
largest institutions, and concentrated their headquarters, principally in New York and
Charlotte, North Carolina. The events of 9/11 in particular exposed the potential vul-
nerability of such concentration and the risks to a smooth functioning of our financial
markets should one or more large institution experience financial difficulties. 
The second underappreciated development was the spread of computer-related
technologies in combination with the explosion of intellectual technologies in the
form of financial engineering. This development radically changed both institutions’
risk profiles and their ability to evolve and price assets and liabilities that had previ-
ously been provided only in bundled form or not at all. The resulting decoupling of
the apparent risks—through the use of new derivative instruments—associated with
given assets and liabilities traditionally inferred by looking at balance-sheet measures
or direct inspections via the examination process no longer necessarily reflects an
institution’s true riskiness.
The third development was the growth and expansion of truly global institutions,
which now suggest that the origins of risk and vulnerabilities are not only more com-
plex but may oftentimes be more associated with developments in other parts of the
world rather than in domestic markets. As a result, better communication, coordination,
and sharing of information with non-U.S. regulators are now a necessity. Effective
PCA and SEIR procedures to close institutions before net worth becomes negative
combined with bankruptcy procedures that empower regulators to close institutions
and resolve them promptly hold the greatest promise to limit systemic risk problems
and to control financial crises.
Concluding Remarks and Some Key Issues for the Future
Having reflected upon the study and the papers prepared for the conference, I note
several issues that would be appropriate to consider as potential agenda items should
a similar study be undertaken in the future. The following is a brief list of concerns,
in no particular order of importance.
Accounting reform. As mentioned earlier, the key to risk monitoring and control
is effective valuation of net worth, which requires not only the ability to value assets
and liabilities but also to appropriately consider the interactions among subsidiaries
and affiliates within complex organizations and to understand the implications for
valuation posed by new derivative instruments and contingent liabilities.
Identity theft and privacy issues. As financial markets become more global
and dependent upon electronic transactions, the speed with which funds can be
withdrawn from individuals’ accounts and from entire banking entities is accelerated.
Finding ways to both verify and protect individuals’ identities is crucial to ensuring
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lators in this sphere that has yet gone unexplored.
Shrinking role of intermediaries and the growth of capital markets. Many
countries are now producing financial stability reports, and increasingly these
reports are focusing on the risks and implications of potential systemic problems
emanating from financial markets rather
than from financial institutions. This con-
cern is a natural reflection of the growing
role that capital markets play in financial
intermediation relative to financial institu-
tions. Attention now needs to turn to what
role regulators and central banks may need
to play in dealing with such risks as well as the need to better understand cross-
market and cross-institution linkages that arise from the trading of instruments, such
as derivatives, which now separate out some of the risks that typically had been
embedded in financial instruments and loans.
PCA and SEIR as ways to enhance Basel I and Basel II initiatives. Present
Basel I and Basel II initiatives have concentrated on the definition and measurement
of capital for regulatory purposes and ways to employ them to limit bank risk taking.
The benefit of this exercise has been that institutions are now more systematic and
concerned about their internal risk measurement schemes and capital allocation
methods. Going forward, attention should be given to how to deal with troubled insti-
tutions as their capital positions deteriorate and the role that PCA and SEIR might
play to limit the negative spillover effects of failure and to better protect the tax-
payer from potential liability should major institutions fail and exhaust their deposit
insurance funds.
Consolidation risks. The relaxation of interstate banking restrictions and the
resulting consolidation of the banking industry has resulted in more concentration in
U.S. banking, with most of the nation’s largest organizations headquartered in either
New York or Charlotte. Should one of these large institutions experience financial
difficulty, not only would the prompt resolution of such an institution be extremely
difficult, but also the potential drain on the FDIC fund could be enormous because of
the large size of these mega-institutions. Additionally, the experience of 9/11 has
shown that certain events can actually close down U.S. financial markets and insti-
tutions. The concentration of our largest institutions reduces the geographic diversi-
fication that our banking system once had. So close attention now needs to be paid to
how regulators and the Federal Reserve would respond to a similar event and how we
can best ensure that our markets and institutions are robust.
Role of the lender of last resort. As risks to the smooth functioning of the
financial system and markets are increasingly likely to be associated with liquidity
problems or shocks to particular capital and instrument markets rather than to risks
coming from banking organizations, additional consideration should be given to what
role, if any, the Federal Reserve should play as lender of last resort in limiting the spread
of these risks. In particular, what channels should be employed to provide liquidity?
To whom should this liquidity be available? Would basic open market operations be
sufficient to cushion markets? What role should central banks generally play in dealing
with market liquidity shocks that are transnational in origin?
Cross-border banking. Cross-border banking is growing, and U.S. banking
organizations are playing an increasingly important role in the financial systems and
markets of other countries. At the same time, most of the world’s largest banks are
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now conducting significant operations in the United States. As a result, these insti-
tutions are now faced with myriad different regulatory regimes, regulators are
increasingly dependent upon their counterparts in other countries for information,
and the failure of such institutions will have spillover effects in not only their domestic
economies but perhaps even greater implications for financial systems that are host-
ing them (see Eisenbeis 2006; Eisenbeis and Kaufman 2005, 2006). Regulators need
a better understanding of how to measure and monitor the risks that these institu-
tions pose as well as to seek ways to harmonize their legal, bankruptcy, regulatory,
and supervisory regimes.
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t is a fair conclusion to draw from the papers, comments, and discussion at this
conference that there is general agreement that the study done twenty years ago
correctly identified the issues crucial to a safe and sound banking system. By itself,
that fact is not surprising. I would expect that if you lock five economists in a room
for a year you will end up with a reasonable analysis of any financial problem. What
is more unusual, and more gratifying in this case, is that the study also came up with,
according to the comments at the conference, reasonable recommendations for policy
actions. Even more unusual, it appears that the recommendations were actually based
on the economic analysis. And most unusual, a significant number of the recommen-
dations—and the most significant of them—have been implemented.
My view is that appropriate banking regulatory policy rests on three vertical
columns (I would say “pillars,” but that term is taken): a meaningful capital require-
ment, a good means of monitoring compliance with that requirement, and a closure
rule to be enforced when the capital requirement is not met.
There is widespread agreement with respect to the importance of capital but dis-
agreement about implementation of a requirement. The problem is that capital ade-
quacy is affected by risk, and we have not resolved the problem of measuring risk. In
fact, we do not even agree on the concept of risk. I have long believed that the rele-
vant risk is loss to depositors and the insurance system, but some believe that risk of
failure is also important. 
The measurement difficulty is illustrated both by the Basel discussions and by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) proposed risk-based premium
system. Our inability to resolve this issue leads to support for keeping the current
FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) leverage ratio in effect even after Basel is fully
implemented, but some analysts fear that American banks will be at a competitive dis-
advantage if the leverage ratio approach applies only in America.
This issue is important only if one believes that capital is costly and leverage is
valuable. Many bankers and analysts argue that it is leverage that allows a low return
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on assets to result in a high return on equity. However, George Kaufman has presented
evidence that American banks, which have higher capital/asset ratios than foreign
banks, not only have higher income/asset ratios, as one would expect, but also have
higher income/equity ratios. Finance theory has something to say about this issue—
the Modigliani-Miller analysis tells us that, if markets are efficient (as we all believe
them to be), leverage does not add to the value of the firm. If that proposition applied
in the world of banking, then we could simply require all banks to maintain a high cap-
ital ratio, thereby reducing the risk of failure, at no real cost to the banks.
This argument is not abstract. Over the past several years many cases have been
argued in the Court of Federal Claims on just this issue. The litigation grows out of
the acquisitions of failed thrift institutions
during the 1980s, in which the acquirers
were allowed to count goodwill arising
from purchase accounting as capital. This
practice was prohibited by the Financial
Institutions Reform and Recovery Act
(FIRREA) in 1989, and the Supreme Court ruled that this legislation represented a
breach of contract by the government for which the acquirers could sue for damages.
The government argued, with Merton Miller as one of its expert witnesses, that the
loss of this regulatory capital represented no economic loss since the affected insti-
tutions could simply replace the lost capital by raising “real” capital in the market at
“zero” net cost—zero because in efficient markets the cost of the liabilities or equity
raised is exactly offset by the expected earnings on the cash acquired. (Miller conceded
that the plaintiffs were damaged to the extent of the transaction costs—investment
banking and legal fees—of the capital raising.) While the litigation is not finished,
enough cases have been resolved to conclude that the courts have accepted this posi-
tion. Perhaps Basel would have a different outcome if the U.S. delegation had included
significant representation from the Justice Department instead of relying solely on
the banking agencies, which lack Justice’s familiarity with finance theory.
A way of resolving this issue was strongly endorsed by the authors of Perspectives
on Safe and Sound Banking. Subordinated debt provides a cushion that protects
depositors and the deposit insurance system yet allows banks to be as leveraged as they
or the market believes optimal. But this proposal brings us back to the concept of risk
that I mentioned earlier—subordinated debt, with its fixed charges, does nothing to
prevent failure. If one is concerned with bank failure as a social problem (and not solely
with losses to depositors or insurers), then only equity will do. 
The importance of a closure rule is widely recognized now, but it was not as well
understood twenty years ago. The concept is simple: If capital is greater than zero,
there is no loss to depositors from failure; the logical rule is that closure must occur
before capital becomes negative. The authors spent a good deal of time in considering
this issue. Conceptually, one could close a failing bank at the time its net worth hits zero
(that is, the market value of assets equals the market value of liabilities), but, clearly,
the ability to measure assets and liabilities and to monitor a bank closely enough to find
that precise moment to act does not exist or would be prohibitively expensive. While
we did not use the terms “prompt corrective action,” or even “structured early inter-
vention and resolution,” we did call for closure “when the market value of net worth
goes below some low, but positive, percentage, such as 1 or 2 percent of assets.” 
The problem with this sort of closure rule is that there must be a reliable system
to measure capital. Historical cost accounting just doesn’t work for this purpose
(though it is probably better suited for financial institutions than for other firms in
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clearly better if functioning markets exist. They do for the securities that compose
part of a bank’s portfolio and for mortgage loans that may make up a larger part. No
functioning markets exist for most of the other loans and assets that banks hold. For
most financial assets and derivatives, pricing models can approximate what the market
value would be. This approximation is often referred to as fair-value accounting. 
George Benston, a certified public accountant, was at first skeptical but did
endorse the authors’ support for market-value reporting. I did not really understand
his skepticism until Enron. I believed that modeling could generate valid figures—if
we have market information on an A-rated, ten-year bond and on the shape of the
yield curve, it should be simple to come up with a good approximation of the price of
a fifteen-year bond of the same company. I recognized then that models can generate
errors even if applied honestly and competently, but after Enron it is clear than skep-
ticism toward the use of internally generated models in measuring capital is justified.
As we move toward the Basel endorsement of such an approach, this issue becomes
more significant.
Of course, if there is an inclination to commit fraud, reliance on models to deter-
mine accounting values provides great opportunities.
1 We know that fraud is a poten-
tial problem with any accounting system, but the opportunities to commit fraud are
greater when management’s judgment, rather than markets, is used to determine val-
ues. The tendency to commit fraud is not unrelated to the condition of a bank. During
the savings and loan collapse of the 1980s I saw many managements with previously
spotless records turn to filing false financial reports. Their intent was (often) not per-
manent fraud, but they were dealing in what they thought was a temporary, disastrous
collapse of real estate prices. If they could avoid writing down an asset for a year,
probably its fair or market value next year would be higher (they rationalized).
Regardless of the accounting and reporting system, appropriate monitoring by the
banking agencies must be concerned with fraud. Perspectives on Safe and Sound
Banking stressed this point at a time in which bank examiners generally considered
fraud to be a matter for auditors rather than examiners.
Although I must confess that the review of the book necessitated by this confer-
ence has made me cringe at some passages, I take pride in our ability to identify
issues and to point public policy in the right direction. Over recent years we have
moved significantly in that direction, but we still have a way to go.
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mbedded in our book’s subtitle is the idea that economic perspectives on finan-
cial institutions, markets, and regulatory schemes are dialectical in nature. By
this I mean that measures proposed or adopted to solve problems that particularly
bedeviled policymakers in the past reach forward in time to shape the present and to
influence how one should think about the future. All three conference papers docu-
ment ways in which subsequent financial change has transformed the details of our
analysis into little more than dust in the wind. Still, our subtitle implicitly asserts that
time-traveling is so valuable that sifting through the dust of our ancient study can
help one to understand the forces driving financial change today and how these
forces might eventually take the industry back into trouble.
I see our “Gang of Five” as a team of economic pathologists that the American
Bankers Association (ABA) asked first to diagnose—and only as an afterthought to
treat—the origin, nature, and course of an epidemic disease. In the mid-1980s, the
symptoms of this under-researched “financial instability/inefficiency syndrome” pal-
pably threatened the jobs of many ABA members. Savvy bankers understood that
market pressures generated by insolvent “zombie” thrifts and banks deemed too big
to fail were forcing them to bet their banks in ways that might reward their stock-
holders but put managers’ human capital on the line without adequate compensation.
Fred Furlong and Simon Kwan explore the extent to which subsequent federal
legislation and cross-country regulatory agreements have incorporated some of the
specific therapeutic treatments our Gang suggested. Mark Flannery identifies seven
currently worrisome financial stability issues, issues about which the ABA and fed-
eral regulators might be sufficiently concerned to issue a request for coordinated aca-
demic advice today. Bob DeYoung establishes a longitudinal perspective on these
issues by documenting the many ways in which modern banking practices and market
environments differ markedly from those of the mid-1980s. 
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exists between any innovation in regulation and loophole-seeking avoidance activity
that might be undertaken by parties that find the innovation burdensome. Regulation
begets avoidance activity, and avoidance eventually begets some form of re-regulation.
1
The regulatory adjustments, problems, and market events described in the confer-
ence papers unfold and mutate as part of alternating sequences in which either reg-
ulation spawns new forms of avoidance (RA sequences) or the growing effectiveness
of particular avoidance activities calls for
innovative re-regulation (AR sequences).
What I take to be the lasting value of
our book lies in its accurately diagnosing
what was fundamentally wrong with the
U.S. banking system as of the mid-1980s.
Our diagnosis was that, across the chain of
regulators and regulated institutions, bank
and regulatory incentives were severely misaligned with societal interests. With the
help of other Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee members such as Richard
Aspinwall and Frank Edwards, we managed to sell this diagnosis first to the financial
industry and—despite active resistance from accountability-averse incumbent regu-
lators—finally to elected politicians. With respect to the causes of fragility, the heart
of our own diagnosis was (1) that the industry needed to hold vastly more private
capital and to report this capital more transparently and (2) that federal regulators
needed to price and operate the elements of the federal safety net efficiently and to
make themselves accountable for doing so. Our book explained how well-lobbied safety-
net subsidies, regulatory forbearances, and restrictions on interstate and interindustry
competition had engendered unacceptable levels of individual-institution fragility and
economic waste. 
Because technologies for treating disease evolve and multiply almost as quickly
as the character and number of dangerous pathogens, the value of our perspectives
cannot be accurately scored by counting the number of the hypothetical therapies we
identified that were or were not subsequently adopted. More than a few of the partic-
ular treatments that we recommended (for example, proposals for haircutting unin-
sured depositors, reducing deposit insurance coverages, and reallocating supervisory
authority across federal agencies) obviously flew in the face of political reality. We
offered these ideas, without hope, as illustrative examples of the types of structural
change that could increase market discipline or regulatory accountability. I take satis-
faction from the fact that the pieces of safety-net re-engineering that Furlong and
Kwan catalogue and expertly dissect—the first Basel Accord (1988), the Financial
Institutions Reform and Recovery Act (1989), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) Improvement Act (1991), the Interstate Banking and Branch Efficiency Act
(1994), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999), Basel II (2004), and the FDIC Reform
Act (2006)—all address one of more links in the chain of incentive breakdowns that
we diagnosed. 
However, adapting regulatory protocols to innovative avoidance activity is an end-
less task. Every piece of regulatory re-engineering kicks of a series of RARA sequences.
Inevitably, the range, size, and speed of regulation-induced innovation runs ahead of
the vision and disciplinary powers that regulatory authorities can bring to bear. 
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Within and across countries, what we could call the boundless “complexification”
of financial instruments, institutions, and risk-management strategies is creating an
increasingly nontransparent environment for shifting risks onto national safety nets.
As Flannery stresses, techniques for detecting and resolving the insolvencies of com-
plex multinational institutions remain so embarrassingly improvisational and untested
by bureaucratic “fire drills” as to beggar credibility. 
Designing and testing protocols for resolving the insolvency of large multina-
tional financial organizations is the most urgent problem facing regulators today. The
bigger and more complex a leading bank becomes, the more value its shareholders
can extract from country safety nets. This time around, risk-shifting gives individual
ABA members much less to complain about because well-polished techniques of
incentive contracting and merger deal-making permit bank managers to obtain a fair
share of the rewards that stockholders of complex banks can accrue from shifting
risks onto country safety nets.
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ecause they have received much favorable comment from previous speakers, I
wish first to remind everyone that prompt corrective action (PCA) and structured
early intervention and resolution (SEIR) in the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) in
1991 did not have a very peaceful birth. They were enacted only after a bloody battle
in Congress and over the strong opposition of both the banking industry and most
bank regulators. But because of the large cost of the bank and thrift crises of the
1980s, these two groups had lost much of their public credibility and influence in
Congress. In a rare moment of Camelot, Congress was willing to listen to academics
(with the support of the Treasury Department, the Congressional Budget Office, and
the General Accounting Office), who promised to effectively “outlaw” bank losses from
insolvency through a legal closure rule at positive capital (Benston and Kaufman 1993).
Most bankers and regulators vigorously fought first against enactment, particu-
larly because of the mandatory nature of some of the sanctions and the closure rule,
and then after enactment for repeal of a number of important provisions, if not the
entire act. Fortunately, both the House and Senate Banking Committees stood firm.
Through time, many bankers and regulators have come to appreciate, if not love,
PCA/SEIR. Moreover, the underlying principles are being copied in many other coun-
tries, at least in word if not always in spirit.
As I reviewed the recommendations we made in the book (Benston et al. 1986),
I found myself now not always in agreement with them, although I suspect I was at
the time. I attribute this shift to a continuing education of George Kaufman. I am not
now enamored with risk-related ex ante FDIC deposit insurance premiums. Outside
of fraud, the major loss to the FDIC from bank insolvencies arises from its failure to
legally close institutions and place them in receivership on a timely basis while their
capital is still positive, either because of a lack of economic capacity (inaccurate or
delayed information) or because of a lack of political will. These forces are difficult
to capture in risk-based premiums. Moreover, as a number of previous speakers
135 ECONOMIC REVIEW First and Second Quarters 2007
Some Further Thoughts about the
Road to Safer Banking
GEORGE KAUFMAN
The author is the John F. Smith Jr. Professor of Finance and Economics in the School of
Business Administration at Loyola University Chicago and a consultant to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. These remarks were presented as part of a roundtable discus-
sion at the conference “Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present, and Future,” held August
17–18, 2006, and cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Banks of San Francisco and
Atlanta and the founding editors of the Journal of Financial Services Research.
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
RoundtableDiscussion  4/12/07  4:19 PM  Page 135136 ECONOMIC REVIEW First and Second Quarters 2007
noted, depositor preference provides a cushion for the FDIC, at least in large banks,
in the form of deposits at foreign branches and funds from nondeposit creditors,
which are subordinated to the FDIC as long as they are not secured. However, the
recently announced FDIC premium proposal, particularly for smaller banks for which
fraud is the major cause of failure, focuses almost entirely on the bank’s probability
of default and not on the loss given default, which is more relevant for gauging the
impact of the failure on the loss assumed by the FDIC. These forces may be proxied
in a premium determination model by the
average loss rate of the FDIC over the past,
say, n years, by size of bank. 
The fact that under the old law many
banks did not pay any ex ante premiums
does not imply that they never paid any
premiums. If losses to the FDIC drove its
reserve ratio below a specified minimum,
then under either the old or the new legis-
lation, the FDIC has to increase premiums
to replenish the fund. To achieve more or
less the same results as the FDIC proposal but with less complexity, it may have been
easier to have merely repealed the 1996 provision prohibiting well-capitalized and
well-managed banks from paying ex ante premiums and splitting the well-managed
cell into separate CAMELS 1 and CAMELS 2 cells.
1
I am also now opposed to risk-based capital requirements for public policy pur-
pose, particularly as specified in Basel II. The basic question is, by which denomina-
tor should a bank’s capital be scaled—total assets or risk-based? In almost no other
industry that I know do analysts or investors compute risk-based capital ratios—not
in the auto industry or the oil industry or the airline industry and so on. Thus, even
if risk-based capital could be measured correctly, its usefulness could be questioned.
And the results of the fourth quantitative impact study (QIS-4) conducted by the reg-
ulators for large U.S. banks cast serious doubt on the credibility of the measure com-
puted from the combination of a banks’ own individual risk models for probability of
default and loss given default and the regulators’ model for computing the associated
risk-based capital requirement. Similarly viewed banks reported widely different
minimum risk-based capital requirements, and the same activity across banks was
associated with widely different risk-based capital requirements. The results also
suggest that the average capital requirement will decline significantly from Basel I
levels and that many of the banks in the test run can satisfy their minimum risk-based
capital requirements with less capital than is required to satisfy the minimum leverage
ratio to be classified as “adequately capitalized” under PCA.
For these banks the leverage ratio serves as a constraint against lower capital. But
few if any analysts argue that there is currently too much capital in the banking sys-
tem. If anything, most would argue that there is too little. Indeed, other evidence sug-
gests that there is a positive relationship between bank capital and profitability both
among all banks in the United States through time and, in recent years, at large banks
across countries (Kaufman 2005). Large U.S. banks are both the most capitalized and
most profitable. In addition, because the underlying bank risk models are proprietary,
they are opaque to outsiders, and the quality of market discipline would be reduced. 
But, not to be completely negative about the Basel exercises, they have enhanced
bankers’ and regulators’ sensitivity to risk, particularly credit risk. Unfortunately, the
work on Basel II has absorbed a substantial number of some of the best minds among
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been involved in fine-tuning the risk weights for different activities, which in the
grand scheme of promoting bank safety and soundness may be viewed as an exercise
in minutia. The opportunity cost of doing this has been high both in the United States
and particularly in other countries. Valuable resources have been diverted from
working on more important issues than how best to measure capital ratios, such as
how to resolve large banks efficiently with the least cost to society, how to share this
information with the public—so that everyone is aware of the rules of the game and
adjusts their ex ante behavior accordingly—and how to prevent policymakers from
changing the rules under pressure and promote accountability. In other countries,
excessive attention to Basel has reduced the focus on developing meaningful PCA-
type provisions to turn troubled institutions around before insolvency and to resolve
them quickly and at least cost when they decline through the minimum capital ratio
specified in the closure rule. Indeed, no serious system for imposing sanctions,
including legal closure, exists in most other countries for banks that fail to meet the
minimum capital requirements. Thus, it is high time to shift the resources from Basel
to other, higher-payoff prudential issues.
I have also changed my mind on whether one should protect the bank or the entire
parent bank holding company. For purposes of deposit insurance, I would protect only
the de jure insured claimants of the bank even though the entire organization is man-
aged centrally on a consolidated basis by the parent and risks may be shifted among the
different subsidiaries, including the bank or banks. Federal Reserve Regulations 23A and
B protect the subsidiary banks from intra–holding company transfers that are not at
arms-length prices. The penalties for violation are stiff. If large bank holding companies
experience difficulties in subsidiaries other than their banks that may be viewed as sys-
temic, it likely reflects the potential for large fire-sale losses on the sale of their assets.
Such problems are best addressed through central bank lender-of-last-resort operations
that provide additional liquidity to increase the demand for the assets. However, in
today’s highly developed U.S. financial markets, liquidity should be injected almost
entirely through open market operations in which the market allocates the injected
funds rather than through the discount window. The latter channel has been used
frequently to support insolvent as well as illiquid institutions. 
It is also interesting to note that although the previous speakers have often cred-
ited the book with recommending PCA/SEIR, the book actually recommends only a
legal closure rule at positive capital. The broader PCA/SEIR framework that allows
the closure rule to be operationally effective by forcing the regulators to become
involved and to impose a series of progressively harsher and more mandatory regu-
latory sanctions before an institution reaches the “critically undercapitalized” level in
the closure rule was not developed until later. This addition to the closure rule, which
mimics the sanctions markets impose in unregulated industries, permits regulators to
attempt to turn banks around before insolvency and buys them time to introduce the
sanctions, including legal closure, on a measured basis. The broader proposal came
out of another task force on enhanced bank safety sponsored by the American
Enterprise Institute a few years later and including some of the same members as the
earlier ABA task force (Haraf and Kushmeider 1988; Benston and Kaufman 1988).
Among the important recommendations not mentioned by the previous speakers
is one for the establishment of “trusteeship” banks to which the regulators can transfer
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the appropriate assets and liabilities of insolvent banks perceived too big to sell or liq-
uidate quickly. Such a structure would have helped greatly in resolving the
Continental Illinois National Bank failure in 1984. The concept was incorporated in
principle in the bridge bank scheme authorized in CEBA of 1987. Temporary feder-
ally chartered bridge banks are likely to be increasingly used in resolving very large
banks to avoid liquidity losses both to depositors through freezing or delaying access
to the par value of their insured deposits and the estimated recovery value of unin-
sured deposits and to borrowers by delaying access to their credit lines. These oper-
ations can be transferred from the insolvent bank to the bridge bank effectively
overnight with customers largely unaffected except for possible credit losses to unin-
sured claimants. That is, physical closure, which is bad, is separated from legal closure,
which is good. Moreover, if regulators are able to apply the legal closure rule in time,
in the absence of major fraud, credit losses should be minimal if at all.
Finally, the book recommends that the authorities “should publicly announce
and follow policies to deal with failures and runs.” I cannot support this recommen-
dation more strongly today. Unfortunately, little has been done to achieve it. As I noted
earlier, in the absence of such policies, regulators’ credibility to do the right thing is
undermined. In particular, in the absence of well-specified and widely publicized plans
to resolve large bank insolvencies efficiently at lowest cost to the insurance fund, the
pressure on the regulators at the time of failure to protect all depositors and credi-
tors of the bank and possibly even of the parent holding company will be intense and
will likely result in such undesirable and costly action as it has in the past. This result
may occur despite the substantial barriers to invoking the systemic risk exemption
that have been built into FDCIA. This result is also likely to occur if the regulators
have a plan but have not announced it publicly. Of all the items for action that I would
put on the agenda for the next twenty years to enhance bank safety and soundness
and minimize the societal cost of failure, I would rank this as the most important.
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